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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years quantum information research has lead to the discovery of a number of remarkable new 
paradigms for information processing and communication. These developments include quantum cryptography 
schemes that offer unconditionally secure information transport guaranteed by quantum-mechanical laws.  Such 
potentially disruptive security technologies could be of high strategic and economic value in the future.  Two 
major issues confronting researchers in this field are the transmission range (typically <100km) and the key 
exchange rate, which can be as low as a few bits per second at long optical fiber distances.  This paper describes 
further research of an approach to significantly enhance the key exchange rate in an optical fiber system at 
distances in the range of 1-20km. We will present results on a number of application scenarios, including point-to-
point links and multi-user networks. 
Quantum key distribution systems have been developed, which use standard telecommunications optical fiber, 
and which are capable of operating at clock rates of up to 2GHz.  They implement a polarization-encoded version 
of the B92 protocol and employ vertical-cavity surface-emitting lasers with emission wavelengths of 850 nm as 
weak coherent light sources, as well as silicon single-photon avalanche diodes as the single photon detectors.  The 
point-to-point quantum key distribution system exhibited a quantum bit error rate of 1.4%, and an estimated net 
bit rate greater than 100,000 bits-1 for a 4.2 km transmission range.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this era of information technology the need for secure communications has become increasingly important. Taking 
advantage of the Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, which states that in general we cannot obtain full information on a 
quantum system as we perform a measurement on it, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides a unique secure way to 
share an encryption key between two users. The “one time pad” approach [1] can utilize this key to provide absolute 
security of encryption, provided that the key is random, is as long as the message and is used only once [2]. QKD 
exploits the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to achieve security in key distribution: for example, the fact that 
the non-orthogonal polarization states of individual photons cannot be simultaneously measured with arbitrarily high 
accuracy. Hence, if the random key data is encoded and transmitted using such states, secure key sharing can be achieved 
because an eavesdropper can only ever obtain partial information on the key and will inevitably generate a detectable 
disturbance on the quantum communication channel. Bennett and Brassard’s original QKD protocol (BB84) [3] employs 
two incompatible pairs of conjugate quantum observables, for example circular and linear-polarization states, to encode 
the data. In Bennett's simpler B92 protocol two non-orthogonal states are utilized, for example two non-orthogonal 
linear-polarization states [4]. To date, many groups have demonstrated the possibility of free-space [5,6] and optical 
fiber-based QKD systems [7,8]. However the key exchange in those systems remains, in general, below 1kbits-1, in 
particular for l ~ 1.55 µm QKD systems, when InGaAs/InP is used as the single-photon detectors. This is due to the 
frequency restriction imposed by the deleterious effects of afterpulsing phenomenon, which is present in these detectors 
even at low count rates. A different approach is possible to increase the bit rate, which consists of using Si Single-Photon 
Avalanche Diode (SPAD) detectors in conjunction with standard telecommunication fiber [9]. In this paper, we present a 
modification of the QKD system described in [9] to include an electronically enhanced commercially-available silicon 
single-photon counting module (SPCM), allowing faster clock rates to be employed.  We show that the use of the 
enhanced module in the QKD system enables operation at clock rates of up to 2GHz [10]. We also describe an 
investigation into the use of a 1´32 network [11] – i.e. one transmitter of the initial photon stream and 32 independent 
potential receivers. Both systems were characterized in terms of quantum bit error rate (QBER) and estimated net bit rate 
(NBR) of the final shared key, as discussed previously in [9]. 
 
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM 
 
 
The characterized QKD system is shown in Fig.1. It is entirely fiber-based, and an interchangeable length of standard 
telecommunications fiber separates Alice (the transmitter) and Bob (the receiver). 
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the quantum key distribution experiment. PBS: Polarization splitter. PC: 
Polarization controller. WDM: Wavelength division multiplexor. APD: Avalanche photodiode. 
VCSEL: Vertical-cavity surface-emitting laser. SPAD: Single-photon avalanche diode. DFB: 
Distributed feedback laser. The arrows represent polarization states of individual photons propagating 
in the optical fiber.  
 
Two 850 nm wavelength vertical-cavity surface-emitting lasers (VCSELs) were used to implement the B92 protocol. 
The VCSELs were driven using two independent laser driver circuit boards, which enabled single mode operation when 
driven under the correct conditions (< 7mA drive current).  The laser driver boards were driven using a non-return to 
zero (NRZ) differential output from a preprogrammed pulse pattern generator (PPG). In order to reduce the probability 
of a multiple photon event in any pulse period, the combined VCSEL pulses were attenuated to an average of ~0.1 
photons per pulse. This ensured that the probability of two photons occurring in any pulse period was less than 0.5%, 
thus reducing the likelihood of a successful photon number splitting eavesdropping attack [12].  
 
The polarized light from each VCSEL was launched into 5.5mm core diameter optical fiber, which was single mode at a 
wavelength of 850 nm. Both Alice and Bob utilized 850-nm single-mode fiber, but were separated by an interchangeable 
length of standard telecommunications fiber. The latter supports more than one mode at an operating wavelength of 850 
nm. However, when a length of standard telecommunications fiber is fusion spliced to a fiber of smaller core diameter 
the fundamental mode is excited and the second order modes are greatly suppressed. Thus, only one stable spatial mode 
propagates in the fiber at all times [13]. 
Two polarization controllers were used to set the polarization states in the two channels to linear with a relative 
polarization angle of 45°. The non-orthogonal polarization states were combined by a polarization independent 50:50 
coupler, and attenuated to a mean number of 0.1 photons per laser pulse (m) using a programmable attenuator. 
The VCSELs were temperature tuned to have identical emission wavelengths of 850nm in order to avoid spectral 
interrogation by an eavesdropper.  The system was optically synchronized using intense pulses (~1.5´108 photons per 
pulse) generated by a 1.3mm wavelength distributed feedback (DFB) laser, which were wavelength multiplexed into the 
fusion spliced transmission fiber connecting Alice and Bob.  The two wavelengths were demultiplexed at Bob, and the 
1.3mm wavelength pulses were detected and converted into an electrical signal by a linear gain germanium avalanche 
photodiode (APD), biased ~1 V below avalanche breakdown (in the linear multiplication regime). The output of the Ge 
APD was then directed to the synchronization input of the photon-counting acquisition card. 
A bandpass filter (Dl = 30nm centered at 850nm) was inserted into the 850nm quantum channel in order to block any 
remaining 1.3mm wavelength light not removed by the demultiplexer. The dual polarization states arriving at Bob after 
propagating through X km of standard telecommunications fiber, were manipulated to enable 25% of the transmitted data 
to be measured unambiguously. Two fiber based polarizing beam splitters (PBSs) and two silicon SPADs were used for 
this purpose. 
We will denote the fiber channel from which the unambiguous "0s" are measured as channel 0, and correspondingly the 
channel from which the unambiguous "1s" are measured as channel 1. 1. Note that there are two other fiber ports from 
the polarizing beam splitters indicated in fig. 1 by a “?”. These ports indicate the two fiber channels that contain the 
remaining 75% of the ambiguous data. The photons in these ports could be measured using another two SPADs, and the 
collected data could be analyzed statistically to detect the presence of an eavesdropper [14]. 
The “unambiguous” photons from channel 1 and channel 0 were then detected using two commercially-available SPCM-
AQR single-photon detection modules obtained from Perkin Elmer (PKI), one of which was modified for improved 
performance as described below. The output from the SPCM modules was directed to the photon-counting acquisition 
card, which can simultaneously acquire data from both channels.  Data was then collected using the detected photons and 
synchronization pulse in order to characterize the system performance in terms of quantum bit error rate (QBER). 
 
3. ENHANCED DETECTOR 
 
The technique described in [15,16] was exploited to improve the photon timing performance of a standard PKI SPCM-
AQR photon detector module.  An additional circuit card [16] was inserted into the module without modifying the 
original circuit card, which still quenched the avalanche and could still be used for pulse counting. This modification was 
reversible and the additional circuit card could be removed with no detrimental effects to the original circuit card.  A 
pulse pick-off linear network was connected to the SPAD terminal, which was biased at a high-voltage (about 400V). 
The network was specifically designed to extract a short pulse signal with fast rise, practically coincident with the rise of 
the avalanche current.  A fast discriminator with very low sensing threshold was then employed for sensing the onset of 
this pulse.  Therefore, the avalanche current can be sensed at an initial stage of its build-up, when still confined in a small 
area of the detector.  Thus, the time information obtained was not affected by the statistical fluctuations that characterize 
the propagation of the current over the full area of the detector [17]. Hence, the jitter in the measured arrival time of the 
photon was minimized. 
Prior to modification the original module had a full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) jitter of ~570ps at low counting 
rates.  With the modification the module had an improved FWHM jitter of ~370ps. The additional circuit card has the 
added advantage that its performance is more stable at high pulse counting rates (typically above 0.5Mcounts-1).  At such 
rates it is important that the recovery to the baseline level after an avalanche pulse is fast and accurate.  If this recovery 
has a slower tail, even one with a small amplitude, then the superposition of such tails will cause both fluctuations and a 
systematic mean shift of the baseline level, which causes random fluctuations and shift of the triggering level along the 
pulse risetime.  The corresponding effect on the measured photon arrival time causes a degradation of the FWHM value 
and a systematic shift of the centroid and of the peak of the photon timing distribution. These effects, which are 
significant with the original PKI circuit, are strongly reduced by the additional circuit card, as illustrated in figures 2 and 
3. For example, at an incident count rate of 2Mcounts-1 the modified device exhibits a jitter of ~450ps (FWHM), 
compared with ~950ps jitter prior to modification. Temporal broadening of the single-photon detector response has been 
shown to limit the performance of the QKD system [9] since at clock frequencies between 1 and 2GHz and short fiber 
lengths the detected count rate can be between 0.5 and 1.5Mcounts-1.  The reduction in the peak shift does not directly 
improve the QBER, it does however allow the data collection window to stay fixed with respect to the synchronization 
pulse [9]. In a high bit rate transmission system this is of fundamental importance, since it means that each bit remains 
within the proper time slot allotted to it.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Timing jitter full width at half maximum of the standard SPCM SPAD and the SPCM 
SPAD with modified output circuitry. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Shift of the peak position of the standard SPCM SPAD and the SPCM SPAD with 
modified output circuitry. 
 
 
3.1. QKD SYSTEM EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH ENHANCED DETECTOR  
 
In this section we show significant improvements in experimental data in terms of QBER by comparing data taken using 
the standard output of a Perkin Elmer SPCM-AQR photon detector and the output from the additional circuit inserted in 
the module as described above. 
There are three main factors that can cause the QBER in the QKD system to increase with increasing clock frequency: 
(1) broadening and patterning of the VCSEL output pulses due to the limited bandwidth of the laser and associated drive 
electronics; (2) pulse broadening due to dispersion in the fiber; and (3) the timing jitter of the single-photon detectors at 
the receiver Bob.  The most significant contributor to QBER in the system reported here is the detector timing jitter.  
Figure 4 shows the improvement in QBER over a range of high clock frequencies from 1GHz to 2GHz.  Comparing the 
standard SPCM module and the enhanced module for a fixed fiber length of 6.55km the QBER drops below 10% 
between 1 and 2GHz.  This is significant, since a QBER of around 10% is regarded as the threshold value below which a 
quantum key distribution system can be secure from eavesdropping attacks [12].  The impact of the detector modification 
is evident: at a clock rate of 2GHz, for example, the QBER halves from the prohibitively high figure of ~18% to ~7%, 
which is below the security threshold.  As a result, the estimated net key distribution rate after error correction and 
privacy amplification [18] improves from zero to the order of 20kbits-1 at a transmission distance of 6.55km. At 1GHz 
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the net bit rate and QBER do not differ significantly from the values calculated with the standard SPCM SPAD [9], 
which are for example, for a transmission distance of 4.2km, a net bit rate of more than 100kbits-1 and a QBER of 1.4%. 
 
Fig. 4. QBER versus QKD system clock frequency for a fixed fiber length of 6.55 km of 
standard telecommunications fiber. 
 
Fig. 5. QBER versus fiber distance at a clock frequency of 2GHz.  The points filled in black 
are taken with the full fiber transmission distance. The white points were measured using 
optical attenuation to simulate the given distances. 
 
Figure 5 shows QBER versus fiber length at a fixed clock frequency of 2GHz.  It is clear that the QBER has dropped to a 
practical level due to the electronic enhancement in the temporal response of the SPCM module.  In addition, the marked 
increase in QBER that is observed at short distances for the standard detector is greatly reduced with the modified 
detector due to the reduced temporal broadening at high-count rates. 
In summary, these results indicate that use of single-photon detectors with a faster temporal response [19] than the 
SPCM modules currently used in the QKD system, offer the potential benefits of lower QBER and the consequent 
advantages of longer distance key distribution and/or higher key exchange rates. 
 
3.2. CONCLUSION 
The temporal response of a commercially available single-photon counting module has been significantly improved via a 
relatively low-cost modification consisting of the addition of a single dedicated circuit board. The modified detector has 
been shown to offer important benefits when applied in a QKD system operating at clock rates in excess of 1GHz.  
Specifically, the QKD system has been improved in terms of increased workable clock frequency range from 1GHz to 
2GHz, with the results at higher frequencies demonstrating the potential for increased transmission distance. For 
example, for a fiber length of 6.55km and clock rate of 2GHz the QBER was improved from 18% to 7% leading to an 
increase in potential key distribution rate from zero to 20kbits-1. Further improvements in source time response and 
detector timing resolution will further improve system performance, for example the introduction of faster shallow-
junction single-photon avalanche diode detectors [19] and higher bandwidth driving electronics and VCSELs. 
 
 
 
4. QKD MULTI-USER APPLICATION 
 
An investigation into the use of a 1´32 network [11] – i.e. one transmitter of the initial photon stream and 32 
independent potential receivers, with the QKD system described before [9] - was performed.  This means that a different 
cryptographic key can be shared between the transmitter and any of the 32 receivers, but not directly between the each of 
the 32 receivers. A 1×32 optical splitter/coupler was inserted between the transmitter and receiver, although only four 
(arbitrarily selected) ports were used for this demonstration (see figure 6).  This splitter was designed for a wavelength 
range of 1520 to 1570nm [9]. 
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Fig. 6. System schematic.  The main transmission span is composed of l ~ 1.3/1.55mm 
standard telecommunication fiber components. It is only within the secure send (Alice) and 
receive (Bob) stations that specialised 850nm fiber is used.  
 
 
The mean insertion loss of the four ports of the 1´32 splitter at a wavelength of 850nmwas measured to be ~18.7dB.  
This is comparable to the manufacturers’ specification of 16.5dB for a wavelength range of 1520 to 1570nm. We must 
stress that the use of this splitter did incur an increased polarization dependent loss (PDL) when used with 850nm 
wavelength light. The manufacturers specification quoted a PDL of 0.2dB for a wavelength range of 1520 to 1570nm. 
However, for a wavelength of 850nm the PDL varied for each port with a maximum measured PDL of 1.1 dB. This 
meant that the relative angle between the two non-orthogonal linearly polarized states could vary by up to an angle of 5° 
from the original angle of 45°.  This leads to a change in the maximum amount of information that could be gained by 
Eve [20]. Consequently, for this particular experiment the maximum amount of information that she could gain will 
increase from the expected 29.3% (corresponding to the expected 45o angle between states) to 36.3% for a 40o angle 
between states.  This change in relative angle will cause small fluctuations in the measured QBER due to the number of 
detected photons at Bob varying with relative angle.  To compensate for this effect in a practical QKD system the current 
static polarization controllers at Bob should be replaced with automatic polarization controllers. In both PDL and 
insertion loss measurements, we spliced a specialist 850nm single-mode fiber to the standard telecommunications fiber 
immediately before and after the splitter.  This permitted a more realistic estimate of the PDL, which was originated, at 
least in part, by the excitation of secondary fiber modes after the splitter .  
 
The 1´32 splitter/coupler was made from a planar lightwave circuit fabricated using an ion exchange process in glass. 
This fabrication technique exhibits generally a lower PDL compared to fabrication by deposition techniques.  This 
improved PDL performance is due to reduced variation in the density of the inhomogeneous parts in the material during 
the fabrication process. Also the insertion loss of the 1´32 splitter is less wavelength dependent due to this fabrication 
process than those using fused biconical taper techniques.  
 
4.1. MULTI-USER QKD APPLICATION EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Measurements were taken at four of the 32 ports with different lengths of fiber spliced to the arms of the splitter in each 
case. We estimated the QBER and NBR, after taking into account error correction and privacy amplification [7], for 
these four distances. These results are shown in Table 1 and Figure 7. 
 
Fibre
Length (km) QBER (%)
Net Bit
Rate/s
0.0 1.8 37516
2.0 2.5 20278
3.8 2.8 7525
6.4 3.6 2640  
 
Table 1. QBER and NBR values for the 1´32 system, shown in terms of 
four point-to-point distances between Alice and each Bob. 
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Fig. 7. Graph of QBER and NBR against transmission distance for four of the 32 receivers, each with 
different fiber length after the output of the 1´32 splitter. Each point of the graph corresponds to a 
single port. 
 
4.2. CONCLUSION 
 In summary we have demonstrated a quantum key distribution system in a simple multi-user optical network which 
utilized standard telecommunications optical fiber components as the main transmission medium.  The system was 
clocked at a frequency of 1GHz, and demonstrated a maximum key exchange rate of 37.5kbits-1 and a corresponding 
QBER of 1.8% when used in the 1´32 configuration.  
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